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he made office the first object and deliberately assumed or laid off political convictions in order to get it, it is clear that he made at the outset one capital miscalculation: by uselessly wounding the king, he drew upon himself the royal displeasure which for nearly twenty years was a chief obstacle blocking his way into the cabinet. I have never been able to understand how a man of Pitt's perspicacity could have made such a stupendous blunder. And in very truth, if the Great Commoner's course was shaped by the compass of selfish ambition, and all his convictions were but ballast to a topping rhetoric, he was indeed an unskilled pilot the whole voyage. What could Talleyrand have learned from the career of Chatham!

If Dr. von Ruville is too subtle by half, Mr. Williams is perhaps not subtle enough. For the better understanding of Chatham, what is now needed is neither new documents nor further summaries of his speeches (many of them, alas, written by Dr. Johnson!), but a more skillful analysis of his mind and character. I am persuaded that such an analysis—not easily made, it is true—would have spared Mr. Williams the hopeless task of making his hero's early conduct appear consistent, and Dr. von Ruville the ungrateful one of searching out a sordid motive for actions which were often enough not inspired by conscious motive at all. Much of Pitt's early inconsistency was due to the circumstance that he had words and the power of speech before he had matured political convictions. Pitt was no logician, but a man of action who learned how a thing ought to be done only by doing it. As he had little to do in the early years except to harangue, he learned a good deal about making speeches, but very little about how to govern England. "I know that I can save England", he cried. Quite true; but he could not tell any one else how to save England, actually did not himself know how it was to be done, until he set about doing it. When his hand was at last on the helm, then he knew, not from chart or compass, but by feeling the current's pressure on the rudder, where the ship must go. After that experience, no more uncertainty; all his cardinal political ideas became emotional convictions, as unreasoned and as enduring as a religious faith.

With an insight equal to his sympathy and his knowledge, Mr. Williams would have given us a more human, a more convincing Pitt. But his Pitt is more convincing than Dr. von Ruville's. For if Pitt had really been the kind of man Dr. von Ruville makes him out to be, it would never have been worth while, as Mr. Egerton well says, to write so many thick volumes about him.

CARL BECKER.

*The Fall of the Dutch Republic.* By HENDRIK WILLEM VAN LOON.  
(Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1913.  
Pp. xii, 433.)

"WE are endeavoring to make the history of a very dull period readable" (p. 55). In this, the author has succeeded. His book will be

read to the end by any one who has taken it into his hands. In a somewhat rough, occasionally a little boyish, but always vivid style, he has sketched the principal features of the decline and dissolution of the once famous republic whose "Rise", as glorified by Motley, is familiar to the American student, while some parts at least of its history in the days of John de Witt and William III. are interwoven in so widely read a work as Macaulay's *History of England*. "What lies between the days of William III. . . . and the foundation of the modern kingdom, is a subject of quite as much speculation as the mediaeval history of Greece or China. It has been my intention to supply the missing link for the benefit of American readers" ("To the Reader", p. x).

Without having fulfilled the whole of this task, the author may be said to have given a clear and, generally speaking, correct representation of Dutch history in the eighteenth century, especially of the years from 1740 or thereabout to 1784 or 1785. The facts and their connection are presented in the manner of a competent Dutch scholar of to-day. The quality of being by birth a Dutchman has enabled Mr. van Loon to consult in the original as well the political literature of the time as the writings of modern Dutch historians; his connection with American life qualifies him so to treat the complicated matter as to meet the needs and tastes of a public less interested in the shell than in the kernel of the dulllest part of the history of a little foreign nation.

Dull is the name given to this period of our national history not only by Mr. van Loon, but by the average modern Dutchman as well. I for my part am inclined to think that if history is dull, it lies with the historian and never with the history. The phrase simply means that a period has not been treated as it should be. To relate facts which are dramatic in themselves, is comparatively easy. But the facts are not always so, and if they are not, they should not be treated as if they were. "Dull" periods are those the interest of which resides in the substrata exclusively; so to them you have to go.

To have tried to do this and to have tolerably well succeeded in this far from easy task, is the great merit of this book. It is not without faults. It does not sufficiently connect the history of the Dutch Republic in the days of fame with that of modern Holland. Only part of the "missing link" is "supplied". The real subject of the work is the gradual dissolution of the republic; its ultimate downfall is (if not related at length) at least foreshadowed; but the foundation of the modern state, its conditions of life, its prospects and possibilities and the way it has lived up to them, are either dismissed in a few concluding words without much precision, or even absolutely neglected. The reader is left at a loss about what modern Holland stands for. The author admits (p. 406) that "fully fifty years" after the last events mentioned by him somewhat of a new departure was made, but he does not show why or how or to what ends. To fill up completely the gap that (according to his introduction) has attracted the author's notice, another work of the same size would be required.

The subject as defined on the title-page (*The Fall of the Dutch Republic*) would include the event of 1795. Admitting the special reasons that may be invoked for treating the years 1787-1795 in the desultory way used by the author, it remains somewhat uncertain why the latter half of the Patriotic troubles (1784-1787) is represented on so small a scale; especially why the foreign influences, gradually developing into downright foreign direction, which turned from its object every political initiative from within, are left in the dark. On the European relations of Holland between the peace of Versailles and the Prussian intervention of 1787 something more ought to have been said; and the name and work of Sir James Harris mentioned.

The two introductory chapters, Political Development and Economic Development, are very good, the most attractive and most instructive of the work. The psychological side of the question is a little neglected. Above all things, one has to consider (I think) the absolutely abnormal conditions which alone can account for the sudden rise of a population of one and a half million people, surrounded by neighbors of far greater natural resources, to such a pitch of power and glory as the republic had reached in 1648. Her fate was to be obliged to play a leading part in Europe long after these conditions had ceased to exist. From 1672 to his death, William III. strained her means to the utmost and till the peace of Utrecht she had to pay a much larger share in the general cost of keeping the France of Louis XIV. within bounds, than her resources in men and even money in comparison to her allies reasonably entitled them to expect. The moral collapse after all was over was indeed inevitable, and the wonder is not that the overstrained republic went to pieces, but that its agony could last so long. In the Europe which had come into existence after Cromwell, Colbert, Peter, and Frederick, there was no room for Holland as a great power, and she is satisfied now with the rank that naturally becomes her. The political organization without which even the modest rôle of modern Holland could not be assumed, she has not had the genius to invent of herself. She is indebted for it to European commotions which put many things in their proper place, among them our little but not extinguished nation.

I wonder a bit—to return to my author—why a man of so happy gifts as Mr. van Loon should not have taken the trouble to review his text with more care. It abounds in little but really unnecessary inaccuracies, without serious detriment (it may be true) to the general value of his work, but such as are sure to disturb the “benevolent reader” who happens to possess some knowledge of his own upon the subject.

A few instances: “Nowadays”, the House of Hapsburg does not reign in Spain (p. 8). William II. was not married to the daughter of James II. (p. 33). Germany’s prosperity cannot be said to have been destroyed by the Thirty Years’ War *for at least three centuries*: Germany is prosperous now and was so yesterday, long before 1948! (p. 50); in general, the author abuses the superlative a little. The twelve years’

truce was not concluded in 1602 (p. 50). Sixteenth, read seventeenth century (p. 53). The minutes of the meetings of the Messrs. XVII., said by the author never to have been kept, fill many rows in the archives at the Hague (p. 67). "Maryken Meu" means Aunt not "Mother" Mary (p. 124). Affray, read Affry (p. 154). 1751 is wrong (p. 155). Guelen, read Quelen (p. 209). The picture gallery sold by King William III. in 1850 had been formed entirely by his father, and has nothing to do with the pictures in possession of the House of Orange before 1795, which had in the revolutionary times become the property of the French and Batavian nations (p. 292). The estates thought of fleeing to Haarlem, read Amsterdam (p. 394). No violence to the defeated party !!! No shootings (it is true) by the government, but lootings, by the mob, innumerable (p. 395). One million guilders to France as the price of Liberty and Equality would have been a mere trifle. It was a hundred! (p. 401). "They lost their language" is misleading; the Dutch were governed in French, but never ceased for a moment to speak their own tongue (p. 405). The revolution of 1813 cannot be said to have been the work of "a few families". It was certainly no very heroic affair, the Dutch people being in the position to profit by the victories of others; but as far as it went, the movement was sustained by the nation as a whole and a large number of its most conspicuous supporters were regenerated Patriots from the middle classes (p. 405).

This will not be Mr. van Loon's last work, I presume; may the next one keep the promise now held out, and be exempt from this little *manque de tenue*.

H. T. COLENBRANDER.

*Source Problems on the French Revolution*. By FRED MORROW FLING, Ph.D., and HELENE DRESSER FLING, M.A. [Harper's Parallel Source Problems.] (New York and London: Harper and Brothers. 1913. Pp. xiii, 339.)

PROFESSOR FLING's long and earnest advocacy of laboratory work in history renders it eminently fitting that he should be the author of this volume in the series so auspiciously inaugurated by the publication of *Parallel Source Problems in Mediaeval History* by Duncalf and Krey in 1912. The work contains studies on the Oath of the Tennis Court, the Royal Session of June 23, 1789, the Insurrection of October 5 and 6, 1789, and the Flight of the King, June 20, 1791. Each problem is introduced by a short sketch giving the setting, a survey of the sources, a list of questions bringing out the steps in the process of determining the truth and formulating it into a constructive narrative, and finally the sources upon which the students' work is based. Besides this, there is by way of appendix an excellent illustration of the method as applied to "the Tennis Court Oath".

In discussing a work of this kind, which as the author suggests marks a step in the evolution of history teaching, one naturally asks how far